>[!info]- Table of Contents > - [Central Bank Currency Swaps](#Central%20Bank%20Currency%20Swaps) > - [History of Swap Lines](#History%20of%20Swap%20Lines) > - [India - extant status of various liquidity arrangements (bilateral/multilateral swap/Lines of Credit-LoC)](#India%20-%20extant%20status%20of%20various%20liquidity%20arrangements%20(bilateral/multilateral%20swap/Lines%20of%20Credit-LoC)) > - [Bilateral Currency Swaps](#Bilateral%20Currency%20Swaps) > - [1. MoU with Central Bank of UAE (CBUAE)](#1.%20MoU%20with%20Central%20Bank%20of%20UAE%20(CBUAE)) > - [2. Bilateral Swap Arrangement with Japan](#2.%20Bilateral%20Swap%20Arrangement%20with%20Japan) > - [3. Special Currency Swap Agreement with the Central Bank of Sri Lanka](#3.%20Special%20Currency%20Swap%20Agreement%20with%20the%20Central%20Bank%20of%20Sri%20Lanka) > - [Multilateral Swaps (Regional Financing Arrangements) for BoP needs](#Multilateral%20Swaps%20(Regional%20Financing%20Arrangements)%20for%20BoP%20needs) > - [1. SAARC Swaps](#1.%20SAARC%20Swaps) > - [2. BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA)](#2.%20BRICS%20Contingent%20Reserve%20Arrangement%20(CRA)) > - [Lines of Credit](#Lines%20of%20Credit) > - [Other Currency Swaps/RFAs for BoP needs (RBI is not a part of them)](#Other%20Currency%20Swaps/RFAs%20for%20BoP%20needs%20(RBI%20is%20not%20a%20part%20of%20them)) > - [1. Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM)](#1.%20Chiang%20Mai%20Initiative%20Multilateralisation%20(CMIM)) > - [2. The Asian Bond Fund (ABF)](#2.%20The%20Asian%20Bond%20Fund%20(ABF)) > - [3. The Federal Reserve’s Swap Lines](#3.%20The%20Federal%20Reserve’s%20Swap%20Lines) > - [4. FLAR - Latin American Reserve Fund (1978)](#4.%20FLAR%20-%20Latin%20American%20Reserve%20Fund%20(1978)) > - [5. Arab Monetary Fund](#5.%20Arab%20Monetary%20Fund) > - [IMF loans](#IMF%20loans) > - [Provisioning of INR liquidity for other central banks and sovereign-backed entities by RBI](#Provisioning%20of%20INR%20liquidity%20for%20other%20central%20banks%20and%20sovereign-backed%20entities%20by%20RBI) > - [Related Notes](#Related%20Notes) > - [Related Data Releases](#Related%20Data%20Releases) > - [References](#References) > - [Others](#Others) ## Central Bank Currency Swaps 1. In a currency swap, two parties _exchange_ principal (loan) and interest payments (on loans) in two different currencies, 2. It can involve exchange of only principal, only interest payments or both. 3. They are are different from the [[Forex Swaps|forex swaps]]. 1. Currency swaps involve spot/forward principal exchanges and ongoing interest payments, but forex swaps involve only spot/forward principal exchanges without interest payments 4. Central bank currency swaps are just one specific type of currency swap, where only the borrowing central bank pays interest on the currency it draws, while the lending central bank does not pay interest on the borrower's currency it holds as collateral. 5. They are also called central bank currency swap lines (swap facilities) or central bank liquidity swaps. 6. **In this note, it is simply referred to as Currency Swap.** 7. [[RBI_Article_202405_Currency Swaps of the Reserve Bank of India_Ajesh Palayi.pdf#page=2&selection=143,0,143,46|Concept]] - Currency swap line shall mean a transaction between the requesting (receiving/recipient) central bank and a providing central bank by which the requesting central bank purchases US dollars or any other foreign currency (swap currency) from the providing central bank and sells its own local currency in the first leg and returns the foreign currency along with interest payments and receives back its own currency on a later date (the second leg) 8. The providing bank does not pay interest on the currency it acquired in the swap transaction, but remains committed to holding the currency at the foreign central bank instead of lending it or investing it. 9. The exchange rate between swap currency and local currency is fixed at the value date of drawal and would remain same for both legs of the transaction. 10. The requesting/recipient central bank can lend the swapped currency to its domestic banks and financial institutions, on its own terms, conditions and risks. Thus, swaps act like a “discount window” for foreign currency (dollar) borrowers in the recipient country. If any of its commercial banks default, then the recipient central bank either buys the foreign currency (dollars) or uses its reserves to honour the swap or, if it misses payment, it loses the currency held at the providing central bank. 11. Thus, there is just a credit risk for the providing bank from the requesting central bank. There is no exchange rate or interest rate risk. 12. Though many countries have different bilateral and multilateral swap agreements, the ones with the US federal reserve is the most crucial 13. ==These central bank liquidity swaps (swap lines) between central banks are different from the [[Forex Swaps|forex swaps]].== 1. Currency swaps involve spot/forward principal exchanges and ongoing interest payments, but forex swaps involve only spot/forward principal exchanges without interest payments 14. ==As long as both central banks do not spend their foreign currency, however, there is no effect on currency in circulation or on banks’ reserves, and both money supplies remain constant.== 1. If RBI receives JPY from Bank of Japan as part of a swap by giving (crediting) rupees into the BoJ's deposit account at RBI, it increases RM, but domestic money supply (CiC and banks' reserves) remain unchanged RM $=$ Currency in Circulation $+$ Bankers Deposits with RBI $+$ Other Deposits with RBI $\uparrow$ *(liabilities side - Components of RM)* RM = NCB $+$ NFA $\uparrow$ $+$ NDA + Coins - (Net Non-Monetary Liabilities)) *(Assets side - sources of RM)* 2. In this swap, RM rises. The increase in foreign assets is balanced by increase BoJ’s rupee deposits with RBI under “Other Deposits with RBI” on the liability side. 3. Oct, 2017- [The Treatment of Currency Swaps Between Central Banks: Egypt Experience](IMF_20171024_Thirtieth%20Meeting%20of%20the%20%20IMF%20Committee%20on%20Balance%20of%20Payments%20Statistics_The%20Treatment%20of%20Currency%20Swaps%20Between%20Central%20Banks-Egypt%20Experience.pdf), prepared by Central Bank of Egypt 15. **Pricing:** 1. Usually, interest of swap drawal is benchmarked to a financial benchmark like London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR)_8_. Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR), Euro short-term rate (ESTR) etc., depending on the currency of the swap drawal. It is paid by the requesting party to the providing party. 2. A spread is added to this benchmark to cover multiple risks involved including the default risk. Quantum and duration of the swap, sovereign credit rating of the recipient country, past records of repayments of swap and other external obligations, probability of default, operating charges and geopolitical considerations are the major factors considered while the providing party decides on the spread. The benchmark is usually reset at the time of rollover of the swap. 3. Swap mechanisms normally have provisions of penal interest rate if there is an occurrence of default. ![[Image_Currency Swaps of the Reserve Bank of India_RBI_Monthly Bulletin 2024_Swap Structure.png|250]] _{Source – [Currency Swaps of the Reserve Bank of India: Role in the GFSN and Fostering International Financial Cooperation, by Ajesh Palayi](RBI_Article_202405_Currency%20Swaps%20of%20the%20Reserve%20Bank%20of%20India_Ajesh%20Palayi.pdf)} ## History of Swap Lines 1. The global network of bilateral swap lines (BSLs) expanded dramatically over the past decade. 2. **The Federal Reserve’s Foreign Exchange Swap Lines-December 2007 to February 2010** ^36584f 1. December 12, 2007: 1. The expansion started during the global financial crisis (2007-2009) with the Federal Reserve announcing [swap line](http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080918a.htm)of $20 bn and $4bn for for the European Central Bank (ECB), the Swiss National Bank SNB respectively as funding markets dried. 2. September 18, 2008 1. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, banks in many developed nations became highly averse to lending to each other as they did not trust each other’s ability to repay. 2. This shortage pushed up borrowing costs as lenders sought higher rates to compensate for default risk. The central banks rushed in to supply their local currency but were unable to meet the demand for foreign currency like the US dollar. 3. Therefore existing swap lines with the ECB and the Swiss National Bank were [increased](https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20080918a.htm) and new swap facilities were authorized with the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Canada. 3. October 2008 1. On October 13-14, 2008, it announced it would provide an [unrestricted](https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20081014d.htm) amount of dollars to the ECB, SNB, Bank of England (BoE), and Bank of Japan (BoJ). 2.  Between December 12, 2007, and October 29, 2008, it had arrangements with [14](https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20081029b.htm) foreign central banks. The maturities were 14-day 4. 2013 1. In October 2013, the existing temporary swap lines were converted into a standing agreement.  2. Bilateral Swap Lines (BSLs) with other Advanced Economies (AE) and EM central banks to expire as market conditions improved. 3. During this period, China also started to expand its BSL network in a bid to promote the internationalisation of the Renminbi and facilitate trade and investment. 4. **Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) in 2010:** ^def870 1. The ASEAN+3 countries established Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) in 2010. 1. The Chiang Mai Initiative (2000) was launched in 2000 as a network of bilateral swap lines, created after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–98 to provide mutual protection from financial emergencies. An example - If Brunei needed dollars, it had to negotiate directly with, say, Japan or China. 2. In March 2010, the CMI was multilateralised into a single, unified reserve pool called CMIM. 3. It became a formal, rules-based multilateral arrangement, not a loose web of bilateral deals. 2. Members are the 10 ASEAN members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar) and 3 East Asian partners (China, Japan, South Korea). 3. Thus it is a shared emergency fund (multilateral currency swap) to provide a backstop line of funding (that is address short term liquidity needs) for member countries. 1. The borrowing country exchanges its local currency for US dollars or other reserve currencies 4. The Chiang Mai Initiative (2000) was launched in 2000 as a network of bilateral swap lines, created after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–98. 5. Since its formation, the CMIM member countries did not borrow from the IMF, whereas prior to 2010 few ASEAN countries such as Korea and Philippines were repeat borrowers from the IMF. [^1] 5. Further, the European Central Bank agreed in Oct 2013 to establish a swap network with the People’s Bank of China (PBoC). 1. Under this agreement, it extended Euros worth about USD 50 billion to the PBoC, while the PBoC extended the same amount to the European Central Bank in its currency, the Renminbi. 6. As a result, the number of BSLs increased from only a few in 2007 to 74 as of end-2019. 7. Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the global BSL network has grown further, reaching 91 at the end-2020, with the US Fed (once again) extending temporary BSLs to 9 AEs and EMs. 8. **The Federal Reserve’s Swap Lines in 2020** ^e2bc81 1. On March 16, 2020, central banks of Canada, England, Japan, Europe, US, and Switzerland decided to tap the dollar liquidity swap lines with the US federal reserve. ==Why were the swap deals activated in [2020](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/central-bank-liquidity-swaps.htm)?== 2. The dollar trades far more abroad than in the US. As US dollar is the world’s trade currency, banks and corporates need US dollar. This makes up the off-shore market for US dollar. In normal times, the cost of US dollar in the US remains close to that in the offshore market. This is measured by LIBOR-OIS spread. OIS tells us the implied one week Fed Funds rate. The spread tells us how much more a risky borrower would pay over a "risk-free" borrower like the US. Lower the spread, lower the offshore US dollar funding cost. This is a sign of good supply of US dollar liquidity. 3. As the spread of virus crippled business activity, many corporations in these nations started to face severe cash flow problems. They were unable to meet their payments. Shortage of local currency was being taken care of by their respective central banks, but they can’t supply enough US dollar. As lending and borrowing in US dollar dried up, it became tough for entities to roll-over the outstanding $ debt. Banks then feared defaults from their clients or increased US dollar demand. Thus, not just corporates but even banks started to hoard whatever dollars they could access. A fall in the value of local currency also makes it more difficult to service the $ debt. A steep fall in prices of crude also creates demand for US dollars. 4. If the dollar remains  scarce and expensive, it hurts US financial institutions in many ways. Biggest fear is default risk. Corporations take a hit as exports get expensive. In short, it becomes difficult to pay back or buy from the US. This makes the US government very uncomfortable. 5. The world now required lots of dollars. FX swap rates for getting US dollar in exchange for other currencies hit levels not seen since the global financial crisis. LIBOR-OIS SPREAD rose to 62 basis points as of March 27. Between 2008 and 2009, it was an average of around 79 bps. It hit a high of 364 on Oct. 10, 2008. 6. The Federal Reserve then tried to increase the supply of dollars by lowering the rate, by as much as 150 bps by March 15, 2020. It offered $ swap lines at US dollar overnight index swap (OIS) rate + 25 basis points only against the rate of OIS +100 basis points in 2008.  7. On March 16, 2020, Japan tapped the US dollar swap lines with the Federal reserve and borrowed about $32 billion after the U.S. central bank made a surprise rate cut by 100 bps on March 15. To get an idea of the cost, a loan of $2.05 billion for a 7-day period was borrowed at a rate of 0.410%. It was the biggest amount sought by Japan after the 2008 crisis under the swap lines.  8. Also, it was decided that these central banks will auction U.S. dollars weekly in their country with an 84-day maturity, in addition to the 1-week maturity offered. This was aimed to “effectively” relax tightening in the $ lending market. 9. China has 3rd largest external debt but PBoC does not have any direct $ swap line with the Federal Reserve.  10. On March 19, 2020, the Federal Reserve said it would extend currency swap lines to nine additional countries, i.e., Singapore, South Korea, Brazil, Sweden, Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, Norway and Denmark. So, finally the Fed accepted that the need of dollars of even emerging market economies couldn't be ignored. 11. But the dollar still pushed higher against its peers even after a rate cut. 12. April 2026 - UAE sought US dollar swap line to ease bank liquidity pressures 13. *Must Read:* [Currency Swap Lines, Financial Statecraft, and Dollar Dominance](https://macroeconomicpolicynexus.substack.com/p/currency-swap-lines-financial-statecraft) by Beckworth & Kaminska. (Great breakdown of how the PBOC actually handles capital outflows). ## India - extant status of various liquidity arrangements (bilateral/multilateral swap/Lines of Credit-LoC) **First we attempt to cover various currency swap arrangements of the RBI with other central banks.** ^980a61 ### Bilateral Currency Swaps #### 1. MoU with Central Bank of UAE (CBUAE) 1. **2016** 1. [Feb 12, 2016](RBI_Press%20Release_20160212_RBI%20and%20Central%20Bank%20of%20UAE%20sign%20MoU%20to%20consider%20Currency%20Swap%20Agreement.pdf) - A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between the RBI and the Central Bank of UAE in February 2016 to consider entering into a currency swap agreement subject to the concurrence of the respective governments. 2. **2018** 1. Subsequently, a currency swap agreement between India and UAE was signed on November 30, 2018. 3. On July 15, 2023 the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the Central Bank of UAE (CBUAE) had signed [[RBI_Press Release_230715_RBI and UAE_MoU.pdf|MoUs]] to establish a framework for the use of local currencies for trade transactions between [[Agreements between UAE and India|India and UAE]]. #### 2. Bilateral Swap Arrangement with Japan 1. This [[Bilateral Swap Arrangement with Japan|note]] has more details #### 3. Special Currency Swap Agreement with the Central Bank of Sri Lanka 1. This special [arrangement](https://rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=36597) is in addition to the existing Framework on Currency Swap Arrangement for the SAARC Member Countries. ### Multilateral Swaps (Regional Financing Arrangements) for BoP needs #### 1. SAARC Swaps 1. This [[SAARC Currency Swap Arrangement|page]] has more details. #### 2. BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) 1. The CRA is a mechanism wherein the BRICS countries have established a *self-managed contingent reserve pool* to help to address short term balance of payments crises. 2. It is a multilateral currency swap. 3. July 15, 2014 - Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa signed an international treaty establishing the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), in Fortaleza, Brazil. 1. The initiative to implement the CRA was officially launched in June 2012 by the BRICS leaders at the sidelines of the G-20 Summit that took place in Los Cabos, Mexico. 4. Since 2015 then only South-Africa entered into Fund’s arrangement during COVID crisis. 5. The BRICS countries initially committed to a total resource pool of US$ 100 billion with different individual commitments. 6. Each BRICS member (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) can both request and provide support.. 7. This research [[Currency Swaps of the Reserve Bank of India_RBI_2024.pdf#page=5&selection=56,0,58,12|article]] has more details. 8. On July 15, 2014 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa signed an international treaty establishing the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), in Fortaleza, Brazil. The initiative to implement the CRA was officially launched in June 2012 by the BRICS leaders at the sidelines of the G-20 Summit that took place in Los Cabos, Mexico. ### Lines of Credit 1. They are usually [provided](https://www.eximbankindia.in/lines-of-credit) the EXIM bank of India, whose operations are governed by the Export-Import Bank of India Act, 1981, and is one of the 5 All-India Financial Institutions [[All India Financial Institutions (AIFI)|(AIFIs)]] regulated by RBI under Section 5 of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934. ## Other Currency Swaps/RFAs for BoP needs (RBI is not a part of them) Here we discuss *few* other regional financing arrangements where one of the purpose is to the meet the balance-of payments pressures (short-term) of the member country through currency swaps or direct USD loans ### 1. Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) 1. The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation [[Bilateral, Multilateral Swaps, LoC, Liquidity Arrangements#^def870|(CMIM)]] was launched in 2010. ### 2. The Asian Bond Fund (ABF) 1. The Asian Bond Fund (ABF) initiative was launched by the Executives' Meeting of East Asia and Pacific Central Banks [(EMEAP)](https://www.emeap.org/). 2. It is a group of 11 member central banks and monetary authorities, which would pool a portion of their foreign exchange reserves for the fund that would buy the US-dollar denominated external bonds (FCY bonds) of the member countries. ### 3. The Federal Reserve’s Swap Lines 1. [[Bilateral, Multilateral Swaps, LoC, Liquidity Arrangements#^36584f|The Federal Reserve’s Foreign Exchange Swap Lines-December 2007 to February 2010**]] 2. [[Bilateral, Multilateral Swaps, LoC, Liquidity Arrangements#^e2bc81|The Federal Reserve’s Swap Lines in 2020]] ### 4. FLAR - Latin American Reserve Fund (1978) 1. [Link](https://flar.com/en/about-flar/) ### 5. Arab Monetary Fund 1. [Link](https://www.amf.org.ae/en) ## IMF loans 1. After [1993](https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/extarr2.aspx?memberkey1=430&date1Key=2025-11-30), India has not taken a recourse to [[Borrowing from IMF|IMF loans]]. 2. Before 1991, India relied heavily on multilateral and bilateral assistance, ECBs (to some extent) and NRI deposits, to finance the current account deficit (CAD) Note RBI does not have the legal authority to borrow or draw against external credit lines from the non-official sector. Only official sources like other central banks, the IMF, or sovereign arrangements are allowed The IMF, regional financial arrangements and bilateral swap agreements between central banks, in addition to the countries’ own international reserves, complement and reinforce the global financial safety net. ## Provisioning of INR liquidity for other central banks and sovereign-backed entities by RBI 1. The following approach/solution has been discussed as one of the measures to achieve internalisation of INR in RBI's *Report of the Inter-Departmental Group (IDG) on Internationalisation of INR, 2022. | | Description | | --------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Approach | RBI could be the provider of INR liquidity for an extended period (beyond overnight) through bilateral/multilateral swap arrangements with foreign central banks/sovereign backed entities. Going forward, a scheme similar to LAF may be explored for these foreign central banks/sovereign backed entities based on evolving market conditions. | | Concerns | The RBI liquidity support for INR internationalisation should be of modest amounts so that it does not impede the public policy objectives of low and stable inflation with desired growth. | | Recommended solutions | The RBI may get into a swap arrangement with those central banks. <br> <br>As the lender of last resort, <br>a) RBI can formulate a scheme akin to the LAF facility which is currently extended to participating banks. Under this scheme, the other central banks and Sovereign-backed entities, that have investments in G-secs may be allowed fixed rate repo and fixed rate reverse repo/standing deposit facility for an extended period. **This design would also help minimize the risk on the balance sheet of the Bank**. This will be in addition to the other avenues for the deployment of surplus funds. <br> <br>b) These central banks and sovereign-backed entities, which avail INR liquidity from the RBI, can be allowed to act as clearing agents for the entities under their jurisdiction. <br> <br>For uniformity, liquidity support to foreign central banks can be provided on similar terms as the domestic LAF participants. | ## Related Notes 1. [[Trade Payments]] 1. [[Bilateral Trade Payments between India and Iran]] 2. [Agreements between UAE and India](Agreements%20between%20UAE%20and%20India.md) 2. Currency Swaps 1. [[SAARC Currency Swap Arrangement]] 2. [[Bilateral Swap Arrangement with Japan|Bilateral Currency Swap Arrangement with Japan]] 3. [Sri Lanka's BoP Crisis](Sri%20Lanka's%20BoP%20Crisis%20-%202022.md) 3. [[Borrowing from IMF]] 4. [[Internationalisation of INR OPEN]] 1. [Role of Dollar](Role%20of%20Dollar.md) ## Related Data Releases 1. Press Releases 2. RBI. *Communication, International Relations, Research and Statistics* \[Section in the Annual Report of the RBI-May 30, 2024]. ## References 1. Ajesh Palayi. (2024, May 21). *Currency Swaps of the Reserve Bank of India: Role in the GFSN and Fostering International Financial Cooperation.* *RBI's Monthly Bulletin-May 2024*. [Link](https://rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_ViewBulletin.aspx?Id=22589) | [[Currency Swaps of the Reserve Bank of India_RBI_2024.pdf|pdf]] 2. Joshi, S., & Vidyasagar, P. S. S. (2025, March). _Role of Regional Financing Arrangements (RFAs)_ [Section in _Market access and IMF arrangements: Evidence from across the globe_]. _RBI Bulletin_, March 2025. [Link](https://rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_ViewBulletin.aspx?Id=23262) | [[RBI_Article_20250319_Market Access and IMF Arrangements- Evidence from Across the Globe_Shruti Joshi and PSS Vidyasagar.pdf|pdf]] 3. RBI. (May 30, 2004). Communication, International Relations, Research and Statistics. Annual Report of the RBI-2024. [pdf](RBI_Annual%20Report_2024.pdf#page=203&selection=3,0,5,10) 4. RBI. 2022. Report of the Inter-Departmental Group (IDG) on Internationalisation of INR. [pdf](RBI_Reports_20230705_Report%20of%20the%20Inter-Departmental%20Group%20(IDG)%20on%20Internationalisation%20of%20INR.pdf) 5. RBI. May 30, 2024. Communication, International Relations, Research and Statistics in the Annual Report of the RBI. ### Others 1. The Federal Reserve. (n.d.). Central bank liquidity swaps in "Monetary Policy/Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet". Retrieved on March 25, 2026. [Link](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_liquidityswaps.htm](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_liquidityswaps.htm) 2. Michael J. Fleming, Nicholas J. Klagge. (2010, April). _The Federal Reserve’s foreign exchange swap lines_ (Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Vol. 16, No. 4). Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Link](https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/current_issues/ci16-4.pdf) 3. Central Bank of Egypt (CBoE). (Oct, 2017). *The Treatment of Currency Swaps Between Central Banks: Egypt Experience.* Thirtieth Meeting of the IMF Committee on Balance of Payments Statistics. [pdf](IMF_20171024_Thirtieth%20Meeting%20of%20the%20%20IMF%20Committee%20on%20Balance%20of%20Payments%20Statistics_The%20Treatment%20of%20Currency%20Swaps%20Between%20Central%20Banks-Egypt%20Experience.pdf) 4. The Federal Reserve. (n.d.). FAQs on U.S. Dollar and Foreign Currency Liquidity Swaps. Retrieved on Nov 11, 2025. [Link](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_swapfaqs.htm) | [pdf](The%20Federal%20Reserve_FAQs_U.S.%20Dollar%20and%20Foreign%20Currency%20Liquidity%20Swaps.pdf) 5. The Federal Reserve. (n.d.). Press releases related to currency swaps by the Feds (2007 to 2013). Retrieved on November 11, 2025. [Link](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_liquidityswaps.htm) 6. The Federal Reserve. (March 15, 2020). Coordinated Central Bank Action to Enhance the Provision of U.S. Dollar Liquidity. Press Release. [Link](https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200315c.htm) | [pdf](The%20Federal%20Reserve_Press%20Release_20200315_Coordinated%20Central%20Bank%20Action%20to%20Enhance%20the%20Provision%20of%20U.S.%20Dollar%20Liquidity.pdf) 7. European Central Bank (ECB). (n.d.). What are currency swap lines? in "ECB & You/Explainers". Retrieved on March 25, 2026. [Link](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/explainers/tell-me-more/html/currency_swap_lines.en.html](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/explainers/tell-me-more/html/currency_swap_lines.en.html) | [pdf](European%20Central%20Bank_Explainers_20220516_What%20are%20currency%20swap%20lines.pdf) 8. Central Banking. (March 18, 2020). Banks rush to tap new dollar liquidity facilities. [Link](https://www.centralbanking.com/central-banks/financial-stability/7507416/banks-rush-to-tap-new-dollar-liquidity-facilities) | [pdf](Central%20Banking_20200318_Banks%20rush%20to%20tap%20new%20dollar%20liquidity%20facilities.pdf) 9. Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). (March 17, 2020). Addressing the Global Dollar Shortage: More Swap Lines? A New Fed Repo Facility for Central Banks?Articles/Follow the Money. [Link](https://www.cfr.org/blog/addressing-global-dollar-shortage-more-swap-lines-new-fed-repo-facility-central-banks-more-imf) 10. Bank of England (BoE). (March 15, 2020). Coordinated central bank action to enhance the provision of global U.S dollar liquidity. News Release. [Link](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/2020/march/coordinated-central-bank-action-to-enhance-the-provision-of-global-us-dollar-liquidity) | [pdf](Bank%20of%20England_News%20Release_20200315_Coordinated%20central%20bank%20action%20to%20enhance%20the%20provision%20of%20global%20U.S%20dollar%20liquidity.pdf) 11. Bank of Japan (BoJ). (n.d.). Cooperation with Other Central Banks. Home/International Finance/Cooperation with Other Central Banks. Retrieved on March 25, 2026. [Link](https://www.boj.or.jp/en/intl_finance/cooperate/index.htm/) 12. Beckworth, D., & Kaminska, I. (2026, April 28). Currency swap lines, financial statecraft, and dollar dominance. _Macroeconomic Policy Nexus_. [Link](https://macroeconomicpolicynexus.substack.com/p/currency-swap-lines-financial-statecraft) [^1]: Joshi, S., & Vidyasagar, P. S. S. (2025, March). _Role of Regional Financing Arrangements (RFAs)_ [Section in _Market access and IMF arrangements: Evidence from across the globe_]. _RBI Bulletin_, March 2025. [Link](https://rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_ViewBulletin.aspx?Id=23262) | [[RBI_Article_20250319_Market Access and IMF Arrangements- Evidence from Across the Globe_Shruti Joshi and PSS Vidyasagar.pdf|pdf]]